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The Right to be Forgotten:
Who Decides What the World Forgets?
Patricia Sdnchez Abril
Jacqueline D. Lipton2
ABSTRACT
In May 2014, the Court of justice for the European Union ("CJEU")
surprised the global cyberlaw community by holding that search engines like
Google are "controllers" of the processing of personal data under the
European Union Data Protection Directive. This means that they are
obliged in some circumstances to remove links from search results that
pertain to information that infringes on an individual's rights under the
Directive. This obligation has come to be referred to as an aspect of a digital
right to be forgotten." The search results in question related to a mortgage
sale ofproperty in a bankruptcy that had taken place in 1998. In 2010, links
to a Spanish newspaper's advertisement of the sale showed up prominently
in Google search results and were no longer relevant and arguably damaging
to the data subject.
The case sparked global debate about who should ultimately be
responsible for the protection and erasure ofprivate information online. The
practical result of the decision leaves much discretion in the hands of online
entities, such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, to implement their own internal
procedures for protecting personal data on the basis ofindividual complaints
made to them. There is little to no governmental or judicial oversight of
these procedures.
This Article examines the impact of the recent CJEU decision on global
privacy protection. In particular, it canvasses questions about who should
bear responsibility for the protection of privacy, ultimately arguing that it is
unbefitting and socially undesirable for unchecked businesses to act as the
Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Miami School of Business Administration.
2 David L. Brennan Professor of Law, Director, Center for Intellectual Property Law and
Technology, University of Akron School of Law. The authors would like to thank Professors Eugenio
Pizarro Moreno, Lawrence Siry, David Thaw, Dennis Hirsch, Raymond Ku, and all of the editors of
the Kentucky Law Journal for their comments and support.
' At the time of this writing, the right to be forgotten is a contentious and rapidly-evolving issue in
Europe. As such, the authors note that the law described herein is current as of January 2015. At this
date, both private and governmental working groups have been assembled to work on a coordinated
approach and policies for handling takedown requests.
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ultimate arbiters of privacy. However, the pendulum may now have swung
so far in this direction that the only meaningful approach to protecting
online privacygoing forward is for governments and interest groups to assist
such businesses in making appropriate privacy-protective decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Since the dawn of the Internet age, possibly even before, legal scholars,
philosophers, and others have raised concern about the impact on society of
technology that allows details of an individual's life, including successes and
missteps, to be generally available to others.' As sophisticated search engines like
Netscape, and more recently Google, Bing, and Yahoo!, developed, these concerns
took on a new level of reality. Any youthful mistakes suddenly became infinitely
available and easily searchable online. Even innocent activities that may be
embarrassing or humiliating took on a much more ominous significance.
There have also been many stories, some true and some likely urban myths,
about people who have been adversely impacted in terms of employment searches,
insurance benefits, education, and the like, as a result of information found online
that may be inaccurate or out-of-date. One of the worst risks with such
information is that a data subject may not ever become aware of what caused the
problem if a prospective employer or insurer, for example, does not disclose the
contribution of online information in a decision adverse to a data subject's
application.5
Truthful information, untruthful information, out-of-date information, or
information taken out-of-context may harm an individual in a variety of ways,
including general reputational harm, bullying, harassment, lack of employment
prospects, etc. The scope of the potential damage from the widespread availability
of such information is hard to quantify or qualif. Additionally, the information
itself as the source of the harm can, in some cases, be hard to pinpoint or prove in
litigation. Even where the harm can be quantified and traced to specific online
information, many jurisdictions, notably the United States, do not have powerful
privacy laws under which an individual may seek redress for the damage.
The advent of the Internet prompted many to take the view that this new
technology spelled the death of privacy.6 A number of commentators said that
4 See, e.g., DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY 5-8 (1998) (summarizing ways in which
digital technology enables widespread access to an individual's personal data); SHERRY TURKLE,
ALONE TOGETHER 252-56 (2011) (describing ways in which teenagers share personal information
widely with modern online social media services).
s See Patricia Sdinchez Abril et al., Blurred Boundaries: Social Media Pivacy and the Twenty-First
-Century Employee, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 87-88 (2012).
6 See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Pivacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1465 (2000)
(discussing the "rapid growth of privacy-destroying technologies," including databases relying on
information collected via the Internet, and the effects on informational privacy); Polly Sprenger, Sun on
Privacy: 'Get Over It, WIRED (Jan. 26, 1999), http://archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/175
38 (quoting Scott McNealy, the CEO of Sun Microsystems saying 'You have zero privacy anyway....
Get over it.").
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society would have to adjust to the lack of privacy on the Internet rather than
expect laws to develop to protect a right to privacy.'
Nevertheless, many European jurisdictions did not accede to this view. The
European Convention on Human Rights protects privacy as a basic human right.
The European Union Data Protection Directive ("EU Privacy Directive"),'
adopted in 1995, requires "controllers"' 0 of personal data processing activities" to
adhere to certain standards with respect to the processing, dissemination, and
accuracy of the information,12 as well as consent by the data subject to processing of
certain classes of information." In 2012, the European Union Commission ("EU
Commission") went even further in presenting a proposal for a new General Data
Protection Regulation ("GDPR") that, amongst other things, specifically includes a
right to be forgotten.14
This provision requires a controller to erase certain personal data, to preclude
further dissemination of the data, and to oblige third parties (such as search
engines) to delete links to such data."s While the GDPR will not be implemented
until 2015, some have argued that the right to be forgotten already appears in a
different guise in the current EU Privacy Directive.
This view was borne out by the Court of Justice of the European Union
("CJEU") in May of 2014 in the case of Google Spain v. Agencia Espailola de
Protecci6n de Datos."6 In this case, the CJEU held that a search engine like Google
could be classified as a controller of personal data processing and may be obliged to
delete certain search results that were out-of-date or irrelevant to the purposes for
' See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal
Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667, 1675-76 (2008).
' Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR], available athttp://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Collecti
on_Convention_1950 ENG.pdf.
9 Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, available athttp://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=313007.
1o Id. art. 2(d), at 38 ("'[Clontroller' shall mean the natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data .. . .").
" Id. art. 2(b) ("'[Plrocessing of personal data' ('processing') shall mean any operation or set of op-
erations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection,
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure
or destruction.").
12 Id. arts. 6-8, at 40-41.
13 Id. arts. 7(a), 8(2)(a), at 40.
14 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection ofIndividuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 17, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012)
[hereinafter GDPR], available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2Ol2/com
2012_11_en.pdf.is Id.
1 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espaiiola de Protecci6n de Datos (May 13, 2014),
http://curia.curopa.eu/juris/document/document.jsPtext=&docid=152065&pagelndex=O&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=66245.
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which they were originally processed." The practical result of the decision has been
to place a burden on many global, information-processing businesses to implement
procedures to protect individual personal data. The question has arisen as to
whether such procedures, with little to no governmental or judicial oversight, are
the most appropriate and socially-desirable method for protecting privacy.
This Article considers the impact of the CJEU decision on digital privacy. It
recounts the right to be forgotten's controversial and unusual, but successful, legal
trajectory in both the national and European legislatures and courts. Against this
backdrop, this Article argues that while businesses are socially and practically unfit
to become the ultimate arbiters of privacy, they may now have been effectively
thrust into that unenviable position. If courts themselves struggle in setting the
boundaries between freedom of expression and dignity, between what the public
should know and its prurient curiosity, imagine the difficulties faced by businesses
in shifting that qualitative-and socially vital-determination to them.
Part I memorializes the history of the right to be forgotten from academic,
legislative, and judicial angles. This section culminates at a distinct moment, when,
under a crescendo of complaints to the Spanish Data Protection Authority, a
Spanish court refers a central question to the CJEU: Do the data processing
activities of a search engine like Google make it responsible for the on-demand
erasure of people's personal data? Part II examines the ensuing CJEU decision,
which answered that question in the affirmative, thereby unleashing waves of
surprise, celebration, concern, and confusion. Part III considers the impacts of the
decision on digital, information-based business practices and whether placing the
burden to protect an individual's right to be forgotten on such businesses is
appropriate or even effective in practice, and whether there are currently any
meaningful alternatives. Part IV concludes.
The authors note that we have premised the discussion on the idea that a right
to be forgotten is an important social value in a digital world. Even if we are wrong
on this point, the European Union will continue promoting and protecting the
right and its action will force governments and businesses globally to reconsider
their role in the protection of individuals from harm relating to outdated,
irrelevant, or inaccurate information.
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The right to be forgotten had a bold and unusual evolution. It was borne of the
European notion that privacy is fundamentally a personality right predicated on
dignity, attached to a person rather than to his or her property." We see this
concept reflected in multiple areas of European law, from Europe's general
understanding of intellectual property from a Hegelian personality perspective, to
7 Id.
" See Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the "Tower ofBabel": A "Right to Be Forgotten" and How
Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age of Analytics, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 92-93 (2011).
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Europe's criminal law." From this conceptual point of departure, Spain-ground
zero for the right to be forgotten-jurisprudentially wove what is today known as a
new right.
According to Spanish legal scholars, the right to be forgotten is an "atypical
assumption in the sense that, as of today, it lacks legal formulation and is of limited
dogmatic heft."2 0 The right has been described as developing through the Spanish
courts and legislature in a "slow and, clumsy, yet daring fashion."2' In fact, it does
not appear to be specifically provided or granted by any article of Spanish or
international law.22 Instead, legal scholars and judges have read it as implicit in
various sections of the EU Privacy Directive and Spain's 1999 domestic data
protection law." And legislators have followed suit. The following paragraphs
describe the right's intrepid evolution.
Legal Scholarship
As is the tradition in civil law, the writings of legal scholars provided early
impetus for the eventual formation of the right. In 1991, a Spanish scholar first
alluded to what he called a modern right to be forgotten.24 Professor O'Callaghan
foresaw that certain information flow-and its logical inferences-could harm an
individual's right to privacy if unchecked. He spoke in particular of the case in
which information from a distant time or place is unearthed in the present day to
sully its subject's character. 25
Ironically, Professor O'Callaghan and others attribute the birth of the distinctly
European right to a well-known American privacy case, Melvin v. Reid.27 In this
often-cited 1931 California case, a woman named Gabrielle Darley sued a film
company that made a motion picture about her previous salacious affairs." Darley
" Ashley Messenger, What Would a "Right to Be Forgotten"Mean for Media in the United
States?, COMM. LAW., June 2012, at 29, 29-30, 35. France, Germany, Switzerland, Spain, and the
United Kingdom all recognize a right to remove data about convicted criminals. Id. at 29-30. In France
this was known as le droit A loubli, a predecessor in both name and form to the modern digital
counterpart. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012),
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf.
20 Patricia S. Abril & Eugenio Pizarro Moreno, La Intimidad Europea Frente a la Privacidad
Americana: Una Visidn Comparativa del Derecho al Ovido, INDRET: REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS
DEL DERECHO, Jan. 2014, at 1, 25 (translated by author), available at
http://www.indret.com/pdf/1031.pdf.
21 Id. at 28 (translated by author).
22 Id.
' See Protection of Personal Data art. 7 (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain); GDPR, supra note 14, art.
17.
24 XAVIER O'CALLAGHAN MUfqOZ, LIBERTAD DE EXPRESION Y SUS LIMITES: HONOR,
INTIMIDAD E IMAGEN 54 (1991).
25 Id. at 55.
26 Id. at 54-55 (citing PABLO SALVADOR CODERCH ET AL., QU9 ES DIFAMAR? LIBELO
CONTRA LA LEY DEL LIBELO 97 (1987)).
27 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
2 1 Id. at 91.
'2014-2015] 367
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
had once been a prostitute accused-but later acquitted-of murder.29 According
to the case, in 1918, she "abandoned her life of shame and became entirely
rehabilitated," marrying and "assum[ing] a place in respectable society."" Seven
years later, a film named "The Red Kimono" about Darley's previous life was
released and advertised using Darley's full, real name." Stretching for a legal
ground to protect this now-virtuous woman, the pitying California court held that
even though some of her past was contained in the public record (and thus could
not deemed private), the use of Darley's true maiden name in conjunction with the
film and its advertisement constituted a "direct invasion of her inalienable right ...
to pursue and obtain happiness."32
The decision stands on firmer moral and policy grounds than it does on legal
footing. In fact, the court repeatedly defended its holding by citing the need to
incentivize rehabilitation and reward social reformation." Today, any shred of this
case remaining in U.S. privacy law can be found in the public disclosure tort, which
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of truthful, offensive, private facts that are
not of public concern.34 This California case evidently had a more meaningful legal
impact abroad in the formation of the right to be forgotten, almost a century later.
Governing Legislation
Any student of the right to be forgotten must have at least a cursory
understanding of the thicket of treaties and supranational and national laws that
undergird the incipient right:
Article 16 of the Consolidated Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).s As introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, Article 16(1) establishes the
principle that "everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning
[him or her]."16 Article 16(2) in the Lisbon Treaty introduced a specific legal basis
for the adoption of rules on the protection of personal data."
Articles 1, 7, and 8 of the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights."
Title 1, Article 1 of this supreme charter simply states that "[h]uman dignity is
29 id.
3o Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 93.
" See id.
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
3s Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 16, Oct. 26,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/ENIfXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:FULL&from=EN.
6 Id. art. 16(1).
" Id. art. 16(2).
" Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 1, 7-8, Dec. 7, 2000, 2007 O.J. (C
303) 1 [hereinafter Charter of Rights], available athttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PD
F/?uri=OJ:C:2007:303:FULL&from=EN.
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inviolable. It must be respected and protected."39 Article 7 secures respect for
"private and family life, home and communications."40 Article 8 governs personal
data, granting a data subject protection, and the right to consent, access, and rectify
personal information.4 1
Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights ("ECHR").42 Under its
Article 8, the ECHR states that "[t]here shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right [to private life] except such as is in
accordance with the law." 43 The Convention ensures a European citizen "the right
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."44 The
fundamental right to privacy has been incorporated into the laws of EU member
states. 45 The European Court of Human Rights interprets the Convention, tending
toward a privacy-protective stance.
Articles 5, 6, 8, and 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data.46 When it became apparent that
the protection of the ideals of Article 8 of the ECHR required specific and
systematic development, the Council of Europe prepared what is known as
Convention 108 to safeguard principles of data quality and privacy, and to require
member nations to adopt mirroring national measures." Article 5 governs data
quality, lawful collection, and storage. 48 Article 6 provides that "[p]ersonal data
revealing racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, as well as
personal data concerning health or sexual life may not be processed automatically
unless domestic law provides appropriate safeguards." 49 Article 8 provides the data
subject with avenues for information collection and redress regarding the
maintenance of personal data.5 Article 9 enumerates exceptions, including "state
security," protection of "the data subject," and protection of "the rights and
freedoms of others."5'
1995 European Union Data Protection Directive (Privacy Directive).s2 The
3 Id. art. 1.
4 Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.
42 ECHR, supra note 8, art. 8. The ECHR was formerly the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
43 Id.
4 Id.
45 Id
' Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data arts. 5-6, 8-9, Jan. 28, 1981, 1496 U.N.T.S. 65, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/JNTS/Volume%201496/volume-1496-I-25702-English.pdf.
17 See id. pmbl.
41 Id. art. 5.
49 Id. art. 6.
oId. art. 8.
s Id. art. 9.
52 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
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Directive provides the foundation for the European Union's well-developed privacy
law. The Directive introduced into law the principle that personal data can only be
processed when it meets certain conditions relating to transparency, legitimate
purpose, and proportionality, and requires each member state to set up a
supervisory authority." Of particular interest to the study of the right to be
forgotten, the Privacy Directive's Article 12(b) provides that "Member States shall
guarantee every data subject the right to obtain from the controller: as appropriate
the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not
comply with the provisions of the Directive, in particular because of the incomplete
or inaccurate nature of the data." 54
This right is subject to each member state's exemptions "for journalistic purposes
or the purpose of artistic or literary expression only if they are necessary to
reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom of expression."
The Directive has undergone a series of updates. Most notably, in 2002, the
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, also known as the E-
Privacy Directive, continued to update earlier efforts, covering the confidentiality
of information, traffic data, spam, and cookies.s" The Privacy Directive reacted to
"[p]ublicly available electronic communications services over the Internet," which
"open new possibilities for users but also new risks for their personal data and
privacy."' The specific portions of the Directive implicating the right to be
forgotten are discussed in the following section.
The Directive continued to react to evolving technologies, continually seeking to
implement and improve on its regulatory frameworks. In 2011, the European
Data Protection Supervisor issued an opinion giving the national data protection
agencies the authority to regulate and sanction data protection violations on a
national level.ss
Soon enough, as European citizens issued complaints to their national
authorities, it became dear that there was a clamoring for the ability to delete
personal digital information. In early 2012, Viviane Reding, European
Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship, introduced the
right to be forgotten.s9 She explained that the novel privilege would give Europeans
s See id. arts. 7, 28.
s Id. art. 12(b).
s Id. art. 9; cf Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinaporssi Oy, 2008
E.C.R. 1-09831 (interpreting Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC)).
5' Directive 2002/58, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning
the Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), arts. 5-6, 13-14, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37,
available athttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002L0058.
s7 Id. at 37.
5 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing Technical Requirements for Credit Transfers and
Direct Debits in Euros and Amending Regulation (EC) No 924/2009, 2011 O.J. (C 284) 1, 2-3,
available athttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:284:0001:0004:En:
PDF.
5 Viviane Reding, Vice President, European Comm'n, EU Justice Comm'r, The EU Data
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"the right-and not only the 'possibility'-to withdraw their consent to the
processing of the personal data they have given out themselves."6 o Essentially, "[i]f
an individual no longer wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a data
controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be
removed from their system."" Commissioner Reding made clear that the right to
be forgotten is not an absolute right that can "amount to a right of the total erasure
of history" or should "take precedence over freedom of expression or freedom of the
media." 62
Days after Reding's speech, the right to be forgotten was outlined in Article 17
of the proposed GDPR.6' As drafted, the GDPR gives data subjects:
[T]he right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data relating to
them and the abstention from further dissemination of such data, especially in
relation to personal data which are made available by the data subject while he or
she was a child, where one of the following grounds applies:
(a) [T]he data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they
were collected or otherwise processed;
(b) [T]he data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based ...
or when the storage period consented to has expired, and where there is no
other legal ground for the processing of the data;
(c) [T]he data subject objects to the processing of personal data ...
(d) [Tihe processing of the data does not comply with this Regulation for other
reasons."
The GDPR emphasizes that the right to be forgotten is particularly relevant in
cases "when the data subject has given their consent as a child, when not being fully
aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to remove such
personal data especially on the Internet."6 s
The GDPR sketches only faint boundaries for the right to be forgotten: it may
not apply where data retention "is necessary for historical, statistical and scientific
research purposes, for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, for
exercising the right of freedom of expression, when required by law or where there
is a reason to restrict the processing of the data instead of erasing them."66 Article
80 creates an exemption for "journalistic purposes . .. in order to reconcile the right
Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the
Digital Age 5 (Jan. 22, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-12-
26 en.htn.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
* GDPR, supra note 14, art. 17.
* Id. art. 17(1); see also infra Appendix A for full text of art. 17.
65 GDPR, supra note 14, at 25, 4l 53.
66 Id.
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to the protection of personal data with the rules governing freedom of expression"
in accordance with Article 9 of the Privacy Directive.6 7
The GDPR is the first legislative expression of the right to be forgotten.68
Through it, individuals can request the erasure of their digital data, including
photographs. The GDPR establishes obligations according the subjects' roles in the
information flow process. Of critical importance is the designation of controller.
For example, the person (or entity) responsible for the original publication must
suppress the data and refrain from further diffusion.69 The party responsible for
publishing the data must erase it and inform any third party that touches the data
to follow suit.70 At this writing, it is expected that the GDPR's legislative process
will conclude in 2015, and EU Member States will then have an additional two
years of transition to the new rules. Although the GDPR will not go into full effect
until 2017 (at the earliest), the right to be forgotten has already established a
footing in European case law, as we examine in the next section.
Spanish and European Case Law
Against this academic and legislative backdrop, the Spanish judiciary slowly
began accepting the right to be forgotten, as it began bubbling up in the lower
courts at the end of the 2000s. Unlike the United States, where First Amendment
concerns could have trumped any case in which an individual sought to silence his
past," Spanish courts, like those of other European Union countries, engage in a
proportional balancing of equal constitutional rights-say, between the right to
freedom of expression and the fundamental right to privacy-in deciding cases. 72
That is, when two constitutional rights collide, no clear interpretive guidance exists
on the hierarchy of rights: courts must balance the right to privacy against the right
to freedom of expression on a case-by-case basis. However, Spanish courts have
often capitulated to privacy interests where they determine that time has made the
noxious information irrelevant (or, in American legal terminology, not of legitimate
public concern) or outdated.
In practically forming the right, Spanish courts have also taken direction from
European courts ruling on digital information disclosure. In particular, in 2010, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ, the precursor to the CJEU) examined whether
67 Id. art. 80.
68 See FACTSHEET ON THE "RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN" RULING (C-131/12), EUROPEAN
COMM'N (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheetdata
factsheet data.protectionen.pdf.
69 See GDPR, supra note 14, art. 17; see also infra Appendix A for fill text of art. 17.
7o See GDPR, supra note 14, art. 17.
" See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Europe's "Right to Be Forgotten" Clashes with U.S. Right to Know,
FORBES (May 16, 2014, 8:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/05/16/europes-
right-to-be-forgotten-dashes-with-u-s-right-to-know, Craig Timberg & Sarah Halzack, Right to Be
Forgotten vs. Free Speech, WASH. POST (May 14, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/tec
hnology/right-to-be-forgotten-vs-free-speech/2014/05/14/53c9154c-db9d-11e3-bdal-
9b46b2066796_story.html.
7 See Charter of Rights, supra note 38, art. 52.
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European Union legislation requiring the publication of personal data (for
administrative purposes) contravened European Union privacy dictates.73 Plaintiffs
complained that they suffered privacy harm when the Internet site of the German
Federal Office for Agriculture and Food identified them by name as beneficiaries
of agricultural aid without their consent. 74 The site also disclosed their addresses,
the annual amounts they received, and contained a search tool.75 Although the
noble aim of the legislation was to increase transparency regarding the use of public
funds, the ECJ chastised the implementing institutions, accusing them of a failure
in balancing the objectives of the law with the protection of personal data
embodied in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter." According to the ECJ, similar goals
may have been attained with alternative publication methods, such as anonymized
information.7 7 The court invalidated the regulation as overbroad and violative of
fundamental privacy rights." This case provides an important example of the
balancing that European national and supranational courts require when
determining privacy interests, as well as their penchant for privacy.
But privacy interests do not always win the day against freedom of expression.
In 2011, the first right to be forgotten case in Spain was brought forth in the
national tribunal by an attorney and former judge who brought suit against both
Spain's Constitutional Court" and the newspaper Diario El Pais for removal of all
reference to his name on their respective websites." The Spanish Data Protection
Agency had denied bringing a case on the plaintiffs behalf." The two websites
contained references to the attorney's 1979 conviction for forgery, which he
claimed were causing continuing harm to his professional reputation.82 The
plaintiffs arguments failed on both counts. The court held that freedom of
expression trumped privacy in this case, where truthful information of public
concern was legally published and captured online." Moreover, the Spanish
Constitutional Court was under a legal obligation to report its cases. After failing,
the plaintiff went on to sue Google. Other similar cases followed with varying
" Joined Cases C-92/09 & C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR v. Land Hessen, 2010
E.C.R. 1-11063.
74 id.
75 id.
76 id.
77 id.
78 id.
' The Constitutional Court of Spain is a tribunal that serves as "the supreme interpreter of the
Spanish Constitution." Competences, TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL DE ESPANA,
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/tribunal/competencias/Pages/Competencias.aspx (last visited
Feb. 5, 2015). It is independent of the Spanish judiciary system and is distinct from the Spanish Supreme
Court. Id.
0 S.A.N., May 12,2011 (A.N., No. 2370) (Spain), available athttp://www.podejudicial.es/search
/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&reference=5987513&links=&optimize=20110602&
publicinterface=true.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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degrees of success in the Spanish courts. 4
From 2011 to 2013, complaints to the Spanish Data Protection Agency
proliferated. A campground named Alfaques, where a deadly tanker explosion had
occurred in 1978, sued to remove prominent links to news stories of the disaster,
reasoning that this history was bad for business." A plastic surgeon named Hugo
Guidotti sought the removal of a link to a 1991 newspaper story entitled "The Risk
of Wanting to be Slim," which chronicled a five million Euro malpractice lawsuit
against him." (Because he won the suit, he objected to the dated article's
characterization of him.)17 Ultimately, the Spanish Data Protection Agency
ordered Google to remove links to online news articles in over ninety cases." In its
defense, Google rebutted that Spain was the only country requiring it to remove
links that were not per se illegal."
Without a direct governing law on the right to be forgotten, Spanish courts
were left to piece together the extant Privacy Directive for guidance. The definitive
case became Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espaiiola de Proteccian de Datos.90
When an Internet user entered plaintiff Mario Costeja Gonzalez's name in a
Google search engine, the searcher was presented with links to pages of the La
Vanguardia newspaper from 1998 that contained an announcement listing
Costeja's name in connection with a real-estate auction in a bankruptcy
proceeding." The newspaper was also a defendant in the action, but was ultimately
held not to be liable with respect to the right to be forgotten because it legally
published the advertisement. 92 In 2010, the Spanish Data Protection Director, in
an administrative proceeding, ordered Google Spain and Google, Inc. to adopt the
necessary measures to erase the data from its index and to render their future access
impossible.93 Google Spain and Google, Inc. appealed.
Struggling with these issues on appeal, the Audiencia Nacional (Spanish
84 See, e.g., S.A.N., Apr. 29, 2011 (A.N., No. 2140) (Spain), available athttp://www.poderjudicial
.es/search/doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&reference=5966837&inks=&optimize=2
0110519&publicinterface=true.
ss S.A.P., Oct. 2, 2012 (A.P., No. 1671) (Spain), available at http://www.poderjudicial.es/search/
doAction?action=contentpdf&databasematch=AN&reference=66003008dinks=alfaques&optimize=201
30112&publicinterface=true.
8 Paul Sonne et al., Plastic Surgeon and Net's Memory Figure in Google Face-Off in Spain,
WALL ST.J. (Mar. 7, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487039215045
76094130793996412.html.
87 id.
8 Ciaran Giles, Spain Launches First 'Right to Be Forgotten' Case Against Google,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 21, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/21/right-to-
be-forgotten-google-spainn_851891.html.
" Ciaran Giles, Google appeals Spanish demand to take down links, Associated Press (January 19,
2011, 11:17 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/google-appeals-spain-mandate-down-links-20110119-
065054-473.html.
90 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espatiola de Protecci6n de Datos (May 13, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsPtext=&docid=152065&pagelndex=0&dodang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=66245.
9 Id. ¶ 14.
92 Id. ¶ 16.
9 Id. ¶ 2.
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National High Court) referred to the CJEU some perplexing legal questions
regarding the proper interpretation of Google's obligations to the public under the
Privacy Directive. Since the Directive was written before the days of search
engines, the court reasoned, more guidance was necessary regarding their role vis-
a-vis the mandatory suppression of certain digital information by its controllers. 9 4
The Spanish court referred three main questions to the CJEU:
1. Whether the activities of Google Inc. and the Spanish subsidiary brought
the search engine within the territorial scope of the Directive;
2. If so, whether the activity of the search engine in collecting, caching,
indexing and retrieving data constituted "processing" under the Directive,
for which the search engine would be the data controller; and,
3. If so, whether the individual could invoke rights under the Directive to seek
erasure or object to processing to have the data removed. Could individuals
ask search engines to suppress information that was legally published on the
basis of their subjective belief that such information "could harm them"
and/or their "desire that such information be forgotten"?"
The pending questions for the CJEU understandably caused much chatter and
consternation between both European Union and global watchers. The final CJEU
decision would be eagerly awaited.
In the interim, the Advocate-General Nillo J!iskinen of the CJEU, delivered
an influential, but not binding, opinion on the three central questions of the case.9'
On the first question, the Advocate-General opined that Google, Inc. fell within
the territorial scope of the Privacy Directive regardless of whether it processed
personal data within Spanish territory.97 On the second question, he opined that
search engines were not controllers of personal data from websites and thus
national data protection authorities did not have the power to require an Internet
search engine service provider to withdraw indexed information." Finally, on the
third burning question, Advocate-General Jdiskinen argued that the Directive does
not establish a right to be forgotten; the Directive's rights to data rectification,
erasure, and blocking, according the Advocate-General, only concerned data whose
processing does not comply with the Directive." In sum, the opinion stated,
9 Id. 11 20-21.
9s See id. 120.
9' Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos (June 25, 2013)
(Advisory Opinion of Advocate-General Nillo Jiliskinen) [hereinafter Jiiskinen Advisory Opinion],
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid=138782&pagelndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=758120; Press Release No. 77/13, Court of Justice of the
European Union, Advocate General Jaiskinen Considers That Search Engine Service Providers Are
Not Responsible, on the Basis of the Data Protection Directive, for Personal Data Appearing on Web
Pages They Process (June 25, 2013) [hereinafter Press Release No. 77/13], available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-06/cpl30077en.pdf.
"' Jiiskinen Advisory Opinion, supra note 96, ¶ 64.
9 Id. ¶ 89.
- Id. ¶¶ 136-137.
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"subjective preference alone does not amount to a compelling legitimate ground
and thus the Directive does not entitle a person to restrict or terminate
dissemination of personal data that he considers to be harmful or contrary to his
interests." 00 Many considered this interim opinion indicative of the CJEU opinion
to come, but that was not to be the case.
II. GOOGLE SPAIN V. COSTEJA GONZALEZ: THE CJEU HOLDING
In Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espadola de Protecci6n de Datos, Google
Inc., headquartered in the United States, was a party to the action and Google's
American operations were affected by the court's decision.o As noted in the
Introduction, the proposed GDPR will implement an express right to be forgotten
into European Union law. In the meantime, the CJEU has created virtually the
same right in its recent interpretation of rights already existing under the 1995 law:
the laws enacted throughout European Union member states under the EU Privacy
Directive.102
1. Is Google a controller of personal data processing activities?-The CJEU was
asked to consider whether Google could be regarded as a controller of personal data
processing activities under the Privacy Directive in circumstances where a Spanish
national (Costeja Gonzilez) complained about specific Google search results."0 3
For the purposes of the Directive, "processing of personal data" or "processing" is
defined as "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use,
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment
or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction . . . ."10 Under the Directive,
controller is defined as "the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any
other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means
of the processing of personal data . . . ."'os The definition of personal data.0 6 was
not particularly problematic in its application to this case because it broadly relates
to large classes of information pertaining to an individual data subject, and
" Press Release No. 77/13, supra note 96.
101 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos ¶¶ 43-60 (May
13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsftext=&docid=152065&pagelndex=0&do
clang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=66245.
102 See Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (discussing recent CJEU
interpretation of the Directive in the following sections).
103 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 20.
15 Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
10s Id. art. 2(d).
1o' The Privacy Directive defines "personal data" as "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity." Id. art. 2(a).
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information specifically naming the complainant in the context of a bankruptcy sale
undeniably met the requirements of the definition."o'
With respect to the question of whether Google was involved in data
processing activities within the meaning of the Directive, the CJEU followed
previous precedent in holding that the operation of loading personal data onto an
Internet page is a processing of data within the meaning of the Directive. 08 The
CJEU further noted that Google's activities also involved collecting, retrieving,
recording, organizing, storing, disclosing, and making available to its users (in the
form of search results) personal information about data subjects. 109
These are precisely the activities regulated by Article 2(b) of the Directive and
thus Google was unquestionably engaged in the processing of personal data under
the Directive. It was irrelevant that Google also carried out the same operations
with respect to other types of information and did not treat personal data any
differently from other information indexed by its search engine functions. 1 o
Further, the CJEU held that it was irrelevant that the information in question had
already been published online by La Vanguardia and was not altered by Google."'
With respect to whether Google should be classified as a controller of the data
processing activities under the Directive, the CJEU noted that Google is a body
that "determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data" for the
purposes of Article 2(d) of the Privacy Directive. 112 These purposes and means may
well differ from those of the website on which the information was originally
posted and still satisfy the provisions of Article 2(d).113 In this case, the purposes
and means of processing in a search engine are different from La Vanguardia's
processing and means to advertise the bankruptcy auction.'14
2. Legal Obligations of a controller of personal data processing activities.-
Holding that Google was a controller of data processing activities under the Privacy
Directive was, of course, not the end of the story. The CJEU was then required to
examine the obligations imposed on controllers under the Directive."s The Court
specifically considered the obligations set out in Articles 6 and 12 of the
Directive.1 6 Article 6(1) provides that:
Member States shall provide that personal data must be:
507 Google Spain, Case C-131/12, ¶ 27 ("[I]t is not contested that the data found, indexed and
stored by search engines and made available to their users include information relating to identified or
identifiable natural persons and thus 'personal data' within the meaning of Article 2(a) of [the Privacy
Directive].").
108 Id. ¶ 26.
1o9 Id. ¶ 28.
110 See id.
nI Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.
12 Id. It 32-33.
u1 Id. ¶ 35.
" Id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 35.
115 Id. ¶ 19.
116 Id. ¶¶ 7, 10.
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(a) processed fairly and lawfilly,
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data
for historical, statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as
incompatible provided that Member States provide appropriate safeguards;
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they
are collected and/or further processed;
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be
taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the
purposes for which they were collected or for which they are further processed,
are erased or rectified;
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than
is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they
are further processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for
personal data stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use. 117
Article 6(2) provides that it is the responsibility of the controller to ensure
compliance with the requirements set out in Article 6(1)."' Article 12(b) of the
Directive further provides a right for a data subject to obtain from a controller: "as
appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which
does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.""'
In order to achieve a balance between the rights of those involved in data
processing and the privacy rights of data subjects, the Directive also includes a
provision that allows for processing of personal data under certain circumstances.
Article 7 provides that:
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if:
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or ...
(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject; or ...
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by
the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed,
except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights
and freedoms of the data subject . . . .2
In Google Spain, the CJEU addressed the balance between the search engine's
legitimate interests under Article 7(f) and the data subject's right to privacy.121
... Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
us Id. art. 6(2).
"1 Id. art. 12(b).
120 Id. art. 7.
121 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafiola de Protecci6n de Datos ¶ 74 (May 13,
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf>text=&docid=152065&pagelndex=0&oclan
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Ultimately, it held that the economic interests of a private corporation like Google
could not override the data subject's privacy rights.'22 The CJEU also rejected
Google's argument that a data subject like Costeja should be required to request
removal from the original third party website that published the information (La
Vanguardia's website) rather than to seek redress directly from Google at the same
time:
Given the ease with which information published on a website can be replicated
on other sites and the fact that the persons responsible for its publication are not
always subject to European Union legislation, effective and complete protection
of data users could not be achieved if the latter had to obtain first or in parallel
the erasure of the information relating to them from the publishers of websites.'
Thus, it was unnecessary for the injured party (Costeja) to seek removal of the
information from La Vanguardia's website prior to seeking action from Google
Spain.
The CJEU further noted that an original third party website may have
different reasons for processing information than a search engine and may be
excused for its processing activities under the Privacy Directive. For example, a
newspaper website, such as La Vanguardia, may be excused in its processing of
personal information if that processing is carried out "solely for journalistic
purposes" under Article 9 of the Directive, which expressly balances the right to
privacy against other important social values such as freedom of expression.12 4
Thus, Google could be required to remove links to information published on third
party websites that contain personal information that is inaccurate, irrelevant, or
excessive,125 even where the links are lawful on the third party website. The
publication by La Vanguardia in 1998 of information about the mortgage sale was
accurate and relevant.1 26 However, a linking sixteen years later to that information
in search results did not meet that standard and was regarded as being published
only for Google's own commercial purposes.127
In making this determination, the CJEU noted that in some situations, for
example where the data subject played a prominent role in public life, interference
with his fundamental rights may be justified by the "preponderant interest of the
general public in having . . . access to the information in question." 12 8 However,
g=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=66245.
122 Id. ¶ 81 ("In light of the potential seriousness of [interference with a data subject's privacy
rights], it is clear that it cannot be justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of a
search engine has in that processing.").
123 Id. ¶ 84.
124 Id. ¶ 85.
125 See id. ¶ 93.
126 See id. ("[E]ven initially lawful processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become
incompatible with the directive where those data are no longer necessary in light of the purposes for
which they were collected or processed. That is so in particular where they appear to be inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time
that has elapsed.").
127 Id. ¶ 98-99.12s Id. ¶ 97.
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that was not the case on the facts of Google Spain. In cases where a private
individual's fundamental rights are being infringed, neither the economic interests
of a search engine nor the interest of the general public in accessing the
information should override the data subject's privacy right.'29
III. IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION:
WHO DECIDES WHAT THE WORLD WILL FORGET?
The most obvious impact of the CJEU decision in Google Spain, which will
be reinforced when the GDPR is implemented throughout the European Union, is
that a heavy burden will be placed on online intermediaries such as search engines,
potentially also social networking services, and other popular Internet services to
police the right to be forgotten. Soon after the Google Spain decision, Google
implemented a webform for processing removals. In the first months, the company
reportedly received 135,000 requests for erasure referring to 470,000 links, mostly
from Britain, France, and Germany.13' Throughout the summer and fall of 2014,
Google and other search engines worked with the Article 29 Working Party, a
European Commission advisory group comprised of representatives of each
European Union country's data protection authority, to establish the
implementation of the Google Spain decision."'' The logistics for online erasure, as
well as the work of the advisory group, are at a critical point in their evolution.
Their conclusions and procedures will likely influence privacy practices in Europe,
and potentially globally, for years to come. For this reason, we must look closely at
the impacts of Google Spain.
This section argues that the CJEU decision places an undue burden on online
intermediaries, which become the ultimate arbiters of privacy without judicial or
governmental assistance or oversight. This role involves an unbefitting qualitative
assessment, and carries considerable legal, social, and practical ramifications.
1. The Anatomy of an Erasure: What Online Intermediaries Must Consider in
Determining Privacy.-In a recent questionnaire, the Article 29 Working Party
asked Google and other search engines what criteria they use to balance their
"economic interest and/or the interest of the general public in having access to ...
information versus the right of the data subject to have search results delisted."1 3 2
Google responded as follows, in relevant part:
129 Id. ¶ 99.
1o The Right to Be Forgotten: Drawing the Line, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21621804-google-grapples-consequences-controversial-
ruling-boundary-between.
131 Press Release, Article 29 Data Prot. Working Party, European DPAs Meet with Search
Engines on the "Right to Be Forgotten" (July 25, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/press-material/press-
release/art29-pressmaterial/20140725_wp29-pressrelease-right-to-be-forgotten.pdf.
132 Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, Google, to Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin,
Chair, Article 29 Working Party (July 31, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/publicresources/doc
uments/google.pdf.
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When evaluating requests, we will look at whether the search results in question
include outdated or irrelevant information about the data subject, as well as
whether there's a public interest in the information.
In reviewing a particular removal request, we will consider a number of specific
criteria. These include the individual (for example, whether an individual is a
public figure), the publisher of the information (for example, whether the link
requested to be removed points to material published by a reputable news source
or government website), and the nature of the information available via the link
(for example, if it is political speech, if it was published by the data subject him-
or herself, or if the information pertains to the data subject's profession or a
criminal conviction).1 3 3
The final point about criminal convictions was recently considered by a Dutch
court when reviewing Google's refusal to remove links pertaining to the owner of
an escort agency who was convicted for six years' imprisonment in 2012 with
respect to an attempted incitement for a contract killing.'34 The Dutch court,
applying the ruling from Google Spain, upheld Google's refusal to remove the links
on the basis of the nature of the information involved, despite the fact that an
appeal was pending and the information could be harmful to the complainant in his
personal life in the interim.13s
In coming to its conclusion, the Dutch court was mindful of the need to
balance free speech against privacy rights and pointed out that "[t]he [Google
Spain] judgment does not intend to protect individuals against all negative
communications on the Internet, but only against 'being pursued' for a long time by
'irrelevant', 'excessive' or 'unnecessarily defamatory' expressions." 3 6 Thus, there will
be some situations in which the right to free expression will trump the right to
privacy online.
As other commentators have pointed out, the elements of "being pursued for a
long time" and "unnecessarily defamatory" expression are both judicial glosses by
the Dutch court on the CJEU's Google Spain decision.'3 ' However, they may
provide some clarity to businesses applying the decision in practice. The Dutch
court went even further with respect to information pertaining to a serious criminal
conviction, holding that "[t]he conviction for a serious crime . . . and the negative
publicity as a consequence thereof, in general provide information about an
individual that will remain relevant." 3 1 It would therefore seem that, at least in the
13 Id.
13' Rb. Amsterdam 18 september 2014, KG 2014, 960 m.nt. ZA ([Plaintiff]/Google Neth. BV)
(Neth.), available athrtp://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id-ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:
6118.
13 Id.
'. Joran Spauwen &Jens van den Brink, Dutch Google Spain Ruling: More Freedom of Speech,
Less Right to Be Forgotten for Criminals, INFORRM'S BLOG (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2014/09/27/dutch-google-spain-ruling-more-freedom-of-speech-less-
right-to-be-forgotten-for-criminals-joran-spauwen-and-jens-van-den-brink.
138 Id.
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cases of information about serious criminal activities, the right to privacy may give
way to the right to disseminate the information (or link to websites that
disseminate the information in question).
The following subsection examines some of the challenges now facing
businesses like Google in making determinations such as those arising under the
facts recently considered by the Dutch court. These businesses, with scant guidance
from courts and the European regulations, will have to make decisions that
significantly affect individuals' privacy and may impact many people's daily lives.
Hopefully, the Article 29 Working Party will be helpful in considering these issues
and providing some guidance to those business entities, like Google, faced with
these determinations on a daily basis.
2. Qualitative Decisions Involved in Determining Privacy.-Entities like Google,
Bing, Yahoo!, and many others that handle voluminous amounts of personal data,
often through largely automated processes, will now be faced with determinations
as to when to erase information or links to information that may infringe the right
to be forgotten as contemplated by Google Spain and its progeny, and ultimately as
reconceived in the forthcoming GDPR. These determinations will include
qualitative questions such as:
(a) whether truthful information should be treated differently to false information
and, if so, how to determine which information falls into which category,
(b) how to classify information as "old" versus "new" and at what point does the
"staleness" of information require its removal on request by a data subject;
(c) the relevance of the original source of the publication to a removal request.
For example, is information published in a formal news media outlet to be treated
differently from that published in a personal blog, social media website, or chat
group? The current European laws do not particularly differentiate between true or
false information, other than the Dutch court's suggestion that "unnecessarily
defamatory" information (presumably a form of false information) not be protected
to the same extent as truthful information. Thus, businesses making determinations
about what kind of information should be removed and what should be preserved
are in an extremely invidious position in terms of regulatory guidance. It may be
preferable to err on the side of removal to avoid potential legal liability, but this
imposes significant cost burdens on such businesses and effectively sanctions
censorship at the behest of an individual who may make a vexatious or non-
meritorious complaint about the availability of information.
Perhaps a brief thought experiment will serve to outline how thorny these
issues may become in practice. Consider, for example, the facts from the Guidotti
case in the Spanish court system."'9 In that case, a plastic surgeon sought the
removal of a link to a 1991 newspaper story that detailed a five million Euro
139 See supra Part I.
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malpractice suit against him. He won the suit and thus objected to the link that
would lead Internet searchers to a dated newspaper article's categorization of his
surgical practices. If these facts arose today, would Google (or any other search
engine) be required to remove links to the newspaper story? While the story was
the result of serious journalism, was published in a mainstream media outlet, and it
was factually correct at the time it was published, its continued prominence in
search engine results could harm the doctor's reputation and practice in a way that
mere publication in a newspaper in 1991 would not. Under today's law, is the
article sufficiently outdated and irrelevant to support a removal request, at least
with respect to Google, if not to the newspaper's website? What about the Dutch
court's view of information that is "irrelevant," "unnecessary," or "unnecessarily
defamatory"? Could the dated newspaper article now meet those criterions given
that the doctor ultimately won the lawsuit? Thus, continued prominent access by
Internet searchers to the information provides an unnecessarily misleading portrait
of the doctor in the present day?
An associated question for businesses to consider is how to determine today
what information may be relevant in the future. Much of the current discourse
relates to outdated information that is less relevant now than it may have been in
the past. What about information that did not appear particularly noteworthy or
important in the past but may become relevant in the future? For example, if we
accept that the plastic surgeon is entitled to have his reputation cleansed in light of
winning the legal suit, what would happen if his techniques irreparably damaged a
patient in the future? Would that reanimate the importance or relevance of the
information? Would a search engine that had suppressed links on the basis of the
present law face liability for not realizing that the information could become
relevant in the future? What if the plastic surgeon subsequently ran for political
office and was placed in a prominent position in a department overseeing the
health of citizens? Would the information be relevant then on the basis identified
in Google Spain-that is, the data subject is now playing a role in public life and
the interference with his privacy rights is justified by the interest of the public in
having access to the information? In other words, could relevance ever be
resurrected in light of new events?
Assuming that search engines and other online businesses will now err on the
side of acceding to removal requests to avoid legal liability, an assumption that we
admit may not be borne out in time, what might the general effects of that practice
be on society more generally? Removal of more information might lead to a less
rich public discourse overall and might privilege the more educated, sophisticated,
or wealthy who are more attuned to the laws that allow them to request reputation
cleansing services, and can rely on legal threats to back up their requests.
Interactive, widely-used online services, such as the Google search engine, are
very different entities from those to whom the 1995 Privacy Directive were
targeted. In the 1990s, most online services that processed data were entities that
specifically did so in the course of their businesses, such as educational institutions,
health insurance companies, market research companies and the like. Those entities
2014-2015] 383
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
could be expected to take precautions to protect individual privacy because their
activities were specifically targeted at collecting and processing personal data. Many
of today's online service providers are a different story, only incidentally processing
personal data as part of a much larger operation. Indeed, as noted in Part II,
Google argued in Google Spain that its processes did not distinguish between
personal data and other kinds of data. The search engine was not established
specifically to process personal information, although it incidentally does so as part
of its larger operations.
Asking entities whose focus is not the processing of personal data to invest in
implementing a right to be forgotten is, in some ways, asking for the right to fail in
practical terms or to overtake other rights, like freedom of expression, by
encouraging entities like Google to err on the side of acceding to removal requests.
These entities have also shown that it is unwieldy for them to engage in practices to
protect an individual's right to be forgotten and, with little government oversight,
they may do a poor job in implementing the right, which may lead to increasing
litigation to determine in what circumstances the right to privacy should trump the
right to free speech. Hopefully the Article 29 Working Party can provide some
guidance and prevent excessive litigation in the future.
At the present time, Google is utilizing a process under which an individual
can complain about specific search result links containing irrelevant or outdated
information. Google then uses its own internal procedures, which it does not
necessarily disclose to the public, in order to make its own determination as to
whether the link(s) in question should be removed. Of course, individuals who are
not satisfied with Google's actions in a particular case can bring an action, and are
in practice bringing actions, under European Union laws. However, this process is
expensive, unwieldy, and obviously not globally harmonized. An American citizen,
for example, has little legal recourse against a company like Google with respect to
the removal of links to damaging, but truthful, information. The disharmonization
of privacy law between the United States and the European Union, for example, is
more than just a difference in legislation. The laws in question reflect fundamental
underlying cultural considerations about the roles of privacy and free expression
more generally throughout society. Current interpretations of the European Union
laws, in particular the recent Dutch court decision, suggest that in Europe,
individuals will have more scope to seek to enforce subjective conceptions of
privacy. In other words, individuals will have clearer avenues to subjectively say
what they find offensive and should be removed in terms of their own lives and
reputations. Whether they win or lose (or whether some individuals do not have
the wherewithal to fight a battle in court), the existence of a more subjective
individual privacy right in the European Union weighs in significant contrast to the
position in the United States where privacy does not function significantly as an
individual right.
Google and entities like it are now facing significant costs and uncertainties in
terms of being cast into the position of responsibility in terms of implementing the
right to be forgotten. They will have to shore up their own internal policy
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guidelines in light of judicial decisions in the European Union as well as any
information coming out of the Article 29 Working Party. They will also have to,
and currently are, expending resources on training personnel to implement their
policies, including handling large volumes of removal requests with respect to
personal information. The need to employ and train sufficient personnel to deal
individually with each removal request may simply not be viable for a number of
online service providers. It may lead to a situation where such entities basically try
to automate removal requests and err on the side of removal, or they may fail to
implement any useful policies in the hope that the responsibility for making these
determinations will ultimately be taken out of their hands and that national
governments will develop more workable guidelines on the right to be forgotten.
CONCLUSION
Lamenting the bygone days of privacy, ChiefJudge Kozinski once wrote:
No matter how private, dangerous, hurtful, sensitive, or secret a piece of
information may be, any fool with a computer and an internet connection-which
means just about everybody-can post it online, never again to be private or
secret. They say that removing something from the internet is about as easy as
removing urine from a swimming pool, and that's pretty much the story."
The EU's aggressively-evolving right to be forgotten upends this status quo in
Europe-and has ramifications internationally. The lack of international
harmonization on new digital privacy laws is perhaps now the least of worries for
global online businesses. At present, their most significant struggle is determining
how to implement the European right to be forgotten, at least with respect to
European business operations, in light of the vagaries surrounding the current law
as well as the fact that the current regulations are something of a moving target.
Between the activities of the Article 29 Working Party and the forthcoming
GDPR, global businesses know that the one constant in these regulations is change
and that they will be expected to implement the changes in their internal policies as
and when they come into being. In the interim, courts of the European Union will
continue to interpret the current laws which may enhance certainty in some areas
and may muddy the waters in others. For example, the recent Dutch decision gives
online businesses some clarity as to how to treat information about serious criminal
convictions, but at the same time adds a judicial gloss on the Google Spain
precedent in terms of adding criteria relating to "irrelevant," "excessive," or
"unnecessarily defamatory" information, which may or may not be followed by
other European Union courts.
The upshot is that the implementation of the fundamental European Union
right to be forgotten has effectively been placed in the hands of entities who are not
well placed to maintain that responsibility. Entities like Google have neither the
4 Alex Kozinski, The Dead Past, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 124 (2012), http://www.stanfo
rdlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-117.pdf.
2014-2015] 385
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
corporate interest nor the expertise to protect individual privacy in this way,
particularly if they are being asked to implement different procedures in different
jurisdictions. For example, search results in Europe now look significantly different
to search results in the United States in terms of personal information. These
entities will face increasing pressure to comply with removal requests in Europe
with the threat of litigation for noncompliance looming, at least in relation to those
with the wherewithal to bring legal action or to convince a government entity to
pursue Google on their behalf.
The problem for online businesses is exacerbated by the fact that current
regulations are disharmonized, lack clarity, and appear to be in a constant state of
change. While we would prefer to conclude on a cheerier note, the best we can
hope for is that the current international attention focused at this problem will lead
to faster and dearer resolutions of some of the uncertainties about the nature of the
right to be forgotten, its regulatory future, and the level of guidance or oversight
that may be given to those businesses who are now required to implement it in
practice on a daily basis. We hope that our observations in this Article may assist in
outlining some of the key issues for those involved in law reform as well as those
struggling to determine the appropriate boundaries of the right to be forgotten in
business practice.
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APPENDIX A
Article 17
Right to be forgotten and to erasure' 41
1. The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of
personal data relating to them and the abstention from further dissemination of
such data, especially in relation to personal data which are made available by the
data subject while he or she was a child, where one of the following grounds
applies:
(a) the data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they
were collected or otherwise processed;
(b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based
according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or when the storage period consented to
has expired, and where there is no other legal ground for the processing of the
data;
(c) the data subject objects to the processing of personal data pursuant to
Article 19;
(d) the processing of the data does not comply with this Regulation for other
reasons.
2. Where the controller referred to in paragraph 1 has made the personal data
public, it shall take all reasonable steps, including technical measures, in relation to
data for the publication of which the controller is responsible, to inform third
parties which are processing such data, that a data subject requests them to erase
any links to, or copy or replication of that personal data. Where the controller has
authorised a third party publication of personal data, the controller shall be
considered responsible for that publication.
3. The controller shall carry out the erasure without delay, except to the extent that
the retention of the personal data is necessary:
(a) for exercising the right of freedom of expression in accordance with Article
80;
(b) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in accordance with
Article 81;
141 GDPR, supra note 14, art. 17.
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(c) for historical, statistical and scientific research purposes in accordance with
Article 83;
(d) for compliance with a legal obligation to retain the personal data by Union
or Member State law to which the controller is subject; Member State laws
shall meet an objective of public interest, respect the essence of the right to the
protection of personal data and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued;
(e) in the cases referred to in paragraph 4.
4. Instead of erasure, the controller shall restrict processing of personal data where:
(a) their accuracy is contested by the data subject, for a period enabling the
controller to verify the accuracy of the data;
(b) the controller no longer needs the personal data for the accomplishment of its
task but they have to be maintained for purposes of proof;
(c) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes their erasure and
requests the restriction of their use instead;
(d) the data subject requests to transmit the personal data into another
automated processing system in accordance with Article 18(2).
5. Personal data referred to in paragraph 4 may, with the exception of storage, only
be processed for purposes of proof, or with the data subject's consent, or for the
protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for an objective of
public interest.
6. Where processing of personal data is restricted pursuant to paragraph 4, the
controller shall inform the data subject before lifting the restriction on processing.
7. The controller shall implement mechanisms to ensure that the time limits
established for the erasure of personal data and/or for a periodic review of the need
for the storage of the data are observed.
8. Where the erasure is carried out, the controller shall not otherwise process such
personal data.
9. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with
Article 86 for the purpose of further specifying:
(a) the criteria and requirements for the application of paragraph 1 for specific
sectors and in specific data processing situations;
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(b) the conditions for deleting links, copies or replications of personal data from
publicly available communication services as referred to in paragraph 2;
(c) the criteria and conditions for restricting the processing of personal data
referred to in paragraph 4.

